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Our Protective Tariff Policy
By A. L. Tinsley

Much has been written of late concerning the complete failure
of the “old order,” the leading feature of which is assumed to
have been the practical freedom of business from governmental
supervision and interference. In other words, a system under
which individual initiative and enterprise—the so-called and
much-derided “rugged individualism”—was given full and practi
cally unlimited sway. This is an astonishing assumption, and its
very general acceptance is even more amazing. One must wonder
what Adam Smith would say were he asked his opinion on this
point.
Nothing, however, could be further from the truth. The
nearest approach we have ever had to such a system came to an
abrupt end more than seventy years ago, not as the result of an
economic breakdown due to its shortcomings, but owing to the
commencement of the civil war. It was this catastrophe that
brought to a close the period of low tariffs that had been in effect
for fifteen years, or since 1846, during which it is safe to say that
the country was never more generally prosperous nor the people
more generally contented.
Not the least of the evils resulting from that conflict is that it
was made the occasion and excuse for the imposition of tariff
rates far higher than any that had ever been dreamed of before.
These rates, followed by others even higher, defended and justi
fied first on one ground and then on another, have ever since
continued in effect, except for short intermissions during the ad
ministrations of Grover Cleveland and Woodrow Wilson, until
today we have the highest tariff rates in our history.
It is to the cumulative effects—world-wide in their extent—of
this disastrous policy of governmental interference with the ordi
nary and otherwise perfectly normal and legitimate business
affairs of the individual citizen, that the present economic
distress and unparalleled unemployment may be chiefly attrib
uted. When in some respects at least, the greatest nation on
earth has set such a pernicious example of unsocial behavior
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and strait-jacketing of trade, is it any wonder that the economic
machinery of the world has gotten out of gear?
The Republicans dug the pit: the Democrats have deepened it.
Instead of utterly repudiating the policy so largely responsible
for our present tragic condition, the Democrats have seemingly
approved of it in principle, besides making the application of
the principle of governmental interference far more sweeping in
character. Many of them, however, seek to justify their actions
on the ground that the legislation they have enacted is purely
“emergency” in character.
Reciprocal trade agreements have recently been executed with
several countries, and more or less relief of our economic ills is
expected from the general adoption of this plan. These agree
ments are in the nature of emergency measures, and are entered
into under the authority conferred on the president by the amend
ment of the tariff act of 1930, approved on June 13, 1934. Such
agreements may not increase or decrease existing duties by more
than fifty per cent. Apparently the principle of protection is
not brought into question, but broader powers are allowed the
president in adjusting duties than those granted under the socalled flexible provision of the tariff act of 1930, for equalizing
costs of production at home and abroad on imported articles.
No attempt is made here to discuss the latter provision in
detail. Even were it possible to obtain satisfactory costs of
production for the purpose intended, the fact remains that as
we live in a changing world, the costs of today, by reason of
changes in prices of raw and other materials, in rates of wages,
in methods of production, in the personnel of labor and manage
ment, etc., may not be the costs of tomorrow. For a number of
other reasons, however, it is considered as wholly impracticable
to determine such costs, for example—
(a) How can trustworthy costs be ascertained in the numerous
cases in which access to the books of the foreign producer is
denied to the representatives of our government?
(b) Based upon what sound principles of accounting can an
average cost per unit of production be determined, as between the
high and low-cost producers of a given article in our own country?
Apparently relatively few people consider what serious restric
tions our protective tariff policy, by confining business transac
tions practically within the limits of a closed market, has placed
upon business initiative and enterprise. Many of our people, and
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these by no means the least intelligent, fail to understand that this
virtual denial of the right to engage in foreign trade—of the
right to do business in a field incomparably larger, and one offer
ing possibilities of greater rewards eventually, than our own
country-results in shutting the door of opportunity to a large
proportion of our population.
Not very many of us appear to realize what a great injustice
and wrong is done the majority of our people—the great body of
consumers—by compelling them to pay artificially increased
prices for many of the necessaries of life, and how surely such a
policy leads to their eventual impoverishment and loss of purchas
ing power.
Until comparatively recently, perhaps, not a great deal of
importance would appear to have been attached to the part
played by our protective tariff in bringing about a major decline in
our foreign trade. This has now become so staggering, however,
due to our refusal to engage in two-way trading transactions with
other countries, as to lead to the fear that much of this trade has
been lost to us permanently, by reason of the competition it has
invited and made necessary.
The conferring of special tariff privileges has the effect of creat
ing vested interests. Such interests do not voluntarily as a rule
surrender their special privileges, and we thus have a government,
no matter what smoke screens it may use to conceal the real facts,
which plays favorites, and is thus at least, and to this extent, not a
government “for the people”. Such a policy leads naturally
and logically to the control of natural resources and the concentra
tion of wealth in fewer hands. That we are faced with such a
condition today no one can successfully deny. Perhaps, one of
the worst effects of this interference by the government with busi
ness is the loss of virility and self-reliance on the part of the people
that it tends inevitably to produce. Like coddled children who
run crying to their parents whenever they get into difficulties or
imagine they are hurt, so we have acquired the habit of appealing
to the federal government for aid in the solution of our business
and other problems. If either mental, moral or physical growth
and development can be acquired except through struggle and the
overcoming of opposition, the history of mankind has not indi
cated it. In the field of economics, obedience to the inexorable
though salutary law of supply and demand develops competent,
self-reliant, and progressive business men. It is to the fact that
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we have tried to evade or ignore this law, that many of the ills
which now afflict us such as overproduction, or, rather, under
consumption may be directly traced.
Much might also be said as to the part greed plays in the enact
ment of tariff legislation, together with the mistaken ideas as to
the nature and purpose of trade disclosed in such proceedings.
Limitations of space prevent the going into details; suffice it to
say that, all trade, whether national or international, is based
on the motive of gain or satisfaction of wants. Men sell that
which they produce either better or more cheaply than can the
purchasers, and they buy in exchange those products in which
the latter possess a corresponding advantage. Both sellers and
buyers thus make worth-while contributions the one to the other.
It does not follow in all cases, however, that the sellers can not
make the goods they buy at less cost than the prices they have to
pay for them. The reason they do not produce such goods is be
cause they make a greater profit by confining their production to
other things. For example: a brickmaker may be able to make
shoes as cheaply as a shoemaker, but he makes a greater profit
by restricting his activities to bricks. Thus specialization of
labor and the principle of comparative costs are two funda
mental laws of trade.
No extended argument should be necessary to prove that those
countries possessing exceptional advantages in the quantity,
quality or location of their raw materials, should be permitted
to market them freely to the mutual benefit of all concerned. It
should likewise be unnecessary to point out that low prices of
goods stimulate and encourage their greater consumption and
thus tend to improve standards of living: also, that the increased
demand for such goods brings about a greater demand for the
labor to produce them, thus leading naturally sooner or later to
higher wages. The reactions between demand and supply are
consequently the normal and most potent economic regulators
of production, prices and wages.
There are two deeply rooted errors, however, held by many of
the advocates of high tariffs, to which attention should be
briefly directed. One of these errors consists in the belief that
high wages, together with high standards of living, are associated
necessarily with high costs of production and, conversely, that
low wages are associated with low costs of production. Quite the
reverse of this proposition, strange as it may seem, is believed to
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be the case. Naturally, exceptions may be found at times, but
as a rule and in the long run it is believed to be true, and the
experience and records of the United States tariff commission,
it is thought, will abundantly confirm this view, that well-paid
labor produces proportionately more as well as better made goods
than is the case with poorly paid labor. Thus the labor cost
per unit of product, say, per pound, ton, yard or gallon, etc., for
high paid labor is less than that for poor or underpaid labor.
The other commonly held error consists in the belief that the
money paid for imports represents just so much that might have
been expended for home-made goods and, to that extent, has the
effect of decreasing production and thus lessening the demand for
home labor. What the holders of this point of view fail to appre
ciate is that trade between the people of different countries, if it
is to attain any magnitude, has in the long run to be carried on
reciprocally or on a two-way basis. This is very largely for the
reason that owing to the different currencies in use in the respec
tive countries, it costs too much or is otherwise impracticable to
remit for goods purchased in acceptable exchange or in gold. In
the circumstances, therefore, if reasonably permanent trading
relations on any scale are to be maintained between any two
countries, the purchases by the one will have to be offset by its
sales to the other, cash being used only in settlement of trading
and other balances.
Among other reasons advanced in justification for high tariffs
may be mentioned briefly:
(a) That without them we might find ourselves seriously
crippled in time of war by failure to have on hand a sufficient
supply of essential war-materials. These materials, however—
and the number is not believed to be large—could be obtained
by subsidizing the manufacturers of them. This procedure is
considered far preferable to the imposition of tariff taxes with all
the uncertainty of the amount of the burden thereby saddled
upon the people. Another plan would be for the government
itself to undertake the manufacture of such materials.
(b) That without prohibitory tariffs foreign nations might
dump their surplus goods on us at ruinous prices and thus force
many of our business men into bankruptcy. This peril is deemed
an exaggerated one, and it is so considered by the United States
tariff commission. Exceptional treatment, however, may be re
quired at times in the case of goods produced by a socialistic state,
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or of those which may be the subjects of export bounties of one
kind or another and may come into competition with like goods
produced in our country.
(c) That owing to the demands of labor at times, abnormal
increases in costs of production may occur, which would materi
ally handicap us in meeting foreign competition. Should such a
situation arise at any time, it would seem that labor should be
willing to modify its demands following the production of satis
factory evidence showing its necessity. It seems clear that if we
are to survive as a free commercial and industrial nation, we
must be able to meet competition in those lines of trade and fields
of enterprise in which nature and our peculiar abilities and spe
cial training best fit us to excel. Poorly managed undertakings
and those without economic justification are necessarily fore
doomed to failure, and certainly have no grounds on which to be
supported by the taxation of the main body of the people.
Special privilege is merely disguised or indirect taxation, and
no amount of specious argument can make it otherwise.
It may be said in conclusion that no economic system or trade
agreements of any kind can of themselves guarantee permanent
prosperity. The time will never come when the human element
may be ignored, or when moral issues will not arise which will
have to be met and solved in a spirit of justice and mutual con
sideration. One thing seems reasonably certain and that is that
without freedom and the practical application of the golden
rule, we may never expect to have anything approaching per
manent prosperity. Protective tariffs embody neither of these
principles. In consequence, they act not only as barriers to
trade, but they give rise to feelings of suspicion and ill will among
the nations of the world, the fruit of which is seen in widespread
business stagnation and political unrest. Even purely retalia
tory tariff measures may produce unforeseen and regrettable
consequences.
To summarize: The “old order” or, more properly, the era or
period of low tariffs, during which the country enjoyed a very
general prosperity and contentment, passed out of existence at
the outbreak of the civil war. Since then we have suffered from
excessive interference by the government with business, as chiefly
exemplified by our protective tariff policy. This policy is the
product of a spirit of economic nationalism combined with a
wholly mistaken view of the nature and purpose of trade and is
109
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associated only too frequently with motives of greed and self
ishness.
It has almost completely shackled our foreign trade and has
virtually closed the door to that great and most attractive field
of business enterprise; it has made our country a closed market
for competitive goods, and by the resulting artificial enhancement
of prices on many of the necessaries and comforts of life has
done much to exhaust the purchasing power of the home market;
it has prostrated agriculture and produced unparalleled unem
ployment; it has created vested interests and led to a great con
centration of wealth; and it has weakened individual initiative
and impaired the self-reliance of the people.
Finally, it is an abortive attempt to ignore or circumvent the law
of supply and demand, a law the normal operations of which, al
though beneficent, are as fixed and immutable in the economic
sphere as that of gravitation is in the physical sphere. The
climax of the calamities consequent on the violations of this law
is that they are well-known causes of war.
If for no other reason, therefore, than enlightened self-interest,
it would seem that the recipients of special tariff privileges should
make common cause with all those who are opposed on principle
to protective tariffs and other trade barriers and work together
with them for the final abolition of all such obstructions to trade.
While it may be true that the removal of these barriers may have
to be undertaken more or less gradually to avoid undue disturb
ance to business, it should be none the less thorough and with the
ideal of such a goal kept constantly in mind. Naturally, the
final solution of the problem is conditional on a reasonable ad
justment of such pressing questions as world politics, armaments
and currencies. Also the time will never come when the per
versities of human nature will not have to be taken into account.
It is considered, however, that from an economic standpoint,
the revival of world trade will do more to pave the way for these
other reforms than any other single remedy.
By taking the lead in this vitally important and urgent mat
ter, our country will be merely discharging a long-neglected duty
to right, as far as it is now possible, the great wrong which we
have done, not only to our own people but to the world at large,
and, besides, it will be adopting a very practical means of pro
moting our prosperity and contentment as well as that of man
kind in general.
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